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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to investigate whether non-pecuniary interests of the parties 
should be protected in contract law and what should be the scope of such protection. The paper sheds 
light on the theoretical framework of contract remedies and claims that moral damages are necessary 
for an adequate protection of the interests of the parties to a contract. It further investigates the policy 
arguments against the recoverability of non-pecuniary loss in contract law and argues that such 
arguments cannot be considered a sufficient justification for a bar to moral damages. Finally, based on 
a survey of case law from several European jurisdictions, the article provides insight into the kinds of 
non-pecuniary consequences that may arise from a breach of contract. 
 




1. Recent years have seen increased interest in the concept of non-pecuniary loss and the extent 
to which it should be recognized in claims for damages brought following a breach of contract. The 
significance of this question lies in the practical concerns of parties concluding a contract to estimate 
the risks involved. However, the issue has a crucial meaning also on a theoretical level. This is because 
the scope of loss compensable in the case of a breach is, in fact, a question of what rights a party 
acquires by virtue of entering into a contract. Hitherto the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss in the 
case of a breach of contract has received diverse responses in European legal systems.1 In some 
jurisdictions, particularly those belonging to the Germanic legal tradition, the recoverability of moral 
damages in the case of a breach of contract is denied in the majority of cases.2 On the other hand, 
some European legal regimes, particularly those belonging to the Romanist legal tradition, essentially 
give non-pecuniary loss parity with patrimonial loss in terms of its compensability.3 Finally, some 
                                                   
* PhD; MJur (Oxon). This article benefited from comments by Prof. Stefan Grundmann, the members of the Max Weber 
Programme thematic research group ‘Diversity and Unity: Governance, Constitutionalism and Democracy’ at the 
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to this paper has been funded by the Polish National Science Centre (Project-No. 2012/05/N/HS5/03029). 
1 For a detailed analysis of the solutions adopted in this respect in European legal systems see: V.V. Palmer (ed.), The 
Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss in European Contract Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), passim. 
2 V.V. Palmer, 'European Contractual Regimes: The Contemporary Approaches', in V.V. Palmer (ed.), The Recovery of 
Non-Pecuniary Loss in European Contract Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p 96, 106ff. The 
recovery of damages for non-pecuniary loss caused by a breach of contract has become possible in Germany after the legal 
reform of 2002. Nevertheless, non-pecuniary loss remains unrecoverable unless the breach of contract infringes one of 
the enumerated interests (health, body, freedom, and sexual self-determination) – see § 253 BGB. Furthermore, under 
German law the loss suffered must be within the scope of protection of the contractual duty breached. Thus, the breached 
duty must relate to the protection of one of the enumerated interests. 
3 V.V. Palmer, in The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss, p 95, 96ff. A particularly interesting example may be seen in 
Italian law which originally adopted a conservative approach, however, it steadily transformed itself into one of the most 
liberal regimes in Europe, both in contract and in tort. See e.g. C. Amato, ‘Il Danno Non Patrimoniale da Contratto’, in 
G. Ponzanelli (ed.), Il Nuovo Danno Non Patrimoniale, (Milan: Giuffrè 2004), p 141. 
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jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, adopt a moderate approach and allow 
for the recoverability of moral damages in a limited group of cases.4 This diversification reflects both a 
fundamental confusion concerning the interests which contract law should protect and the 
assumption common in conservative jurisdictions that the recoverability of moral damages would 
raise a range of negative consequences that would outweigh the benefits derived therefrom. A closer 
analysis of the issue reveals that if the interests of the parties in contractual performance are to be 
adequately protected damages must embrace both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary consequences of 
a breach. Even though such a broad scope of compensation may raise certain risks, these risks are not 
significant enough to justify the denial of the recoverability of moral damages. 
 
2. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to defend the argument that damages for non-
pecuniary loss, in principle, should be available in contract law. In doing so, it starts by examining the 
theoretical basis for damages for a breach of contract. Subsequently, it investigates the policy 
arguments against the recoverability of moral damages that have been indicated in legal writings and 
case law. Secondly, having accepted that non-pecuniary loss should be compensable in contract law, 
the paper seeks to identify the categories of cases in which such loss may arise. It argues that the 
optimal level of protection of non-pecuniary interests in contract law must not only embrace cases in 
which the aim of a contract is to satisfy non-pecuniary interests of one of the parties but also instances 
in which the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss is incidental. The claim is based on the examination of 
case law from several European jurisdictions.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to investigate the exact rules that should govern the 
recoverability of non-pecuniary loss caused by a breach of contract: a task which would require a 
monographical survey. Instead, the paper focuses on whether, in principle, non-pecuniary interests of 
the parties should be protected in contract law and what should be the scope of such protection. 
 
2. Rights, Duties, and Wrongs  
 
3. The essence of contract is performance; contracts are made in order to be performed5. A 
person enters into a contract because she desires to receive that which the other party is offering and 
because she places a higher value on the other party’s performance than on the cost she will incur to 
obtain it6. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously claimed that the only consequence of a legally binding 
promise is that ‘the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to 
pass’7. Understood this way, a contractual breach would not be a violation of a primary right but 
merely the choice to perform the alternative primary obligation (thus, it would not be ‘a wrong’)8. The 
difficulties raised by Holmes’s theory have been well documented9. The existence of the primary right 
to performance may be confirmed in a number of ways. For instance, if a contract gave rise either to a 
                                                   
4 V.V. Palmer, in The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss, p 96, 105. 
5 D. Friedmann, 'The Performance Interest in Contract Damages', 111. LQR (Law Quarterly Review) 1995, p (628) at 
629. 
6 Ibid. 
7 O.W. Holmes, 'The Path of the Law', in Collected Legal Papers (New York: Peter Smith, 1952), p (167) at 175; O.W. 
Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1881), p 300–301. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See e.g. P. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p 58–66; R. Cunnington, 'Should Punitive 
Damages be Part of the Judicial Arsenal in Contract Cases?', 26. Legal Studies 2006, p (369) at 385–389; D. Friedmann, 
'The Efficient Breach Fallacy', 18. Journal of Legal Studies 1989, p 1. 
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right to performance or a right to damages, there would be no doctrine of impossibility of 
performance because it is never impossible to pay a sum of money by way of damages. Furthermore, if 
a contract created only a disjunctive obligation either to perform or to pay damages, there would be 
no remedies that compel the performance in the case of a breach of contract. Thus, the one and only 
right that a contract gives rise to is the right to counter-performance10. The secondary right to 
damages arises as a result of an infringement of the primary right to performance and does not exist 
prior to a breach of contract11. A contract creates a right to performance of the promise, and a breach 
of contract, as an infringement of a right, is ‘a wrong’.  
 
4. The interests of the parties in the promised performance are protected by law. An effective 
contractual promise differs from any other for ‘it is intended to, and does in fact, confer on the 
promisee an enforceable legal right to have the promise performed’12. As a result of the formation of a 
contract, the promisor’s choice to perform the promised act transforms into an external object that 
juridically constitutes a part of the promisee’s belongings13. Before entering into the contract, the 
promisor has the power to choose to act in a specific way, subject to the principle that the act should 
not wrongfully infringe the rights of anyone else. Once the contract is concluded, the promisor’s 
choice to perform the promised act belongs to the promisee14. The content of the promisor’s duty 
corresponds to the content of the promisee’s right, thus, the duty and the right are correlative15. 
Hence, a breach of the duty is an infringement of the right. The award of a remedy is a means to 
correct the promisor’s breach of duty by restoring to the promisee the value of the infringed right16.  
 
5. A remedy for a breach of contract maintains the correlativity of the right and the duty. 
Liability for a contractual breach converts the promisee’s right to be free of an unjust loss into an 
entitlement to compensation that is correlative to the promisor’s obligation to provide it17. The 
occurrence of a wrongful loss constitutes the foundation of the promisee’s claim against the promisor 
who caused the loss. ‘Loss’ is commonly understood as ‘being worse off’, thus, the suffering of a loss 
amounts to a detrimental difference to the person who suffers it.18 A legal explanation of the notion of 
loss is rarely provided; only a few European civil codes describe the meaning of the concept. The legal 
definitions are usually very broad and mirror the semantic understanding of the word. For example, 
the Austrian Civil Code in its § 1293 states that loss is to be understood as every detriment inflicted 
upon the property, rights or person of another19. The way of defining the concept of loss in domestic 
regulations corresponds to solutions adopted in the major sets of model rules: the Draft Common 
                                                   
10 R. Stevens, 'Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not?', in J.W. Neyers, R. Bronaugh, S.G.A. 
Pitel (eds), Exploring Contract Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), p (171) at 172. 
11 R. Stevens, in Exploring Contract Law, p 172; H. Unberath, Die Vertragsverletzung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 
p. 285. 
12 B. Coote, 'The Performance Interest, Panatown, and the Problem of Loss', 117. LQR (Law Quarterly Review) 2001, 
p 81. 
13 E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p 139; P. Benson, 'The Unity of Contract', in P. Benson 
(ed), The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), p (118) at 135. 
14 E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, p. 139. 
15 E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, p. 139. 
16 E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, p. 140. 
17 E.J. Weinrib, 'Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies', 78. Chicago-Kent Law Review 2003, p (55) at 
59; E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, 2012, p 143. 
18 See e.g. A. Tettenborn, 'What is a Loss?', in J.W. Neyers, E. Chamberlain, S.G.A. Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), p (441) at 443; R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p 61. 
19 ‘Schade heißt jeder Nachteil, welcher jemanden an Vermögen, Rechten oder seiner Person zugefügt worden ist.’ 
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Frame of Reference (DCFR)20 and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)21. The DCFR 
explains the meaning of loss in a very general manner as ‘any type of detrimental effect’.22 The PECL 
does not define the meaning of the concept but it states in its Art 9:501 that the loss for which 
damages are recoverable includes non-pecuniary loss and future loss that is reasonably likely to occur. 
The language of domestic regulations and soft law rules clearly suggests that the notion of loss 
embraces two kinds of detriments: ‘pecuniary’ and ‘non-pecuniary’. The word ‘pecuniary’ comes 
from the Latin pecuniarius. Pecunia is understood as property, riches, wealth, money23 and the suffix 
‘arius’ means ‘pertaining to’ or ‘belonging to’.24 Hence, pecuniary loss means a detriment relating to 
money, riches, property or wealth of a given person. Non-pecuniary loss, on the other hand, can be 
defined in a negative way as a detriment that is not pecuniary, thus a detriment that does not concern 
money, riches, property or wealth of a given person. Therefore, the decisive factor taken into account 
when classifying a detriment suffered as non-pecuniary loss is neither the immaterial nature of the 
injured interest nor the difficulties in identifying the scope of such damage because also some 
pecuniary losses cannot be precisely quantified. 25  The deciding criterion for identifying non-
pecuniary loss is whether the interference with the innocent party’s interests results in consequences 
other than a diminution of her money, riches, property or wealth.26 
 
6. The aim of contractual remedies is to undo the injustice done by the contract-breaker to the 
innocent party.27 In this way, contractual remedies ensure that the interest of the promisee in the 
promised performance is protected. Unless an infringed contractual right is met with an adequate 
remedy, the right is ‘a hollow one, stripped of all practical force and devoid of all content’28. An 
adequate remedy should provide the innocent party with ‘a full and perfect equivalent’29 for the 
damage that she has suffered. If the innocent party is given more than that, she would have been ‘over-
compensated’; if less, ‘under-compensated’. To compensate the innocent party means providing her 
with something that is good, i.e., with something that is desired or at least desirable, in order to bring 
her up to some baseline of well-being30. In case of contract law, that baseline is typically identified by 
reference to the position that the innocent party would have been in if the contract had been 
performed. This position is best restored by the judicial enforcement of specific performance so that 
the party gets exactly what she bargained for. In cases in which specific performance is not awarded, 
monetary compensation should aim at placing the party in the closest possible position she would 
have been in if the contract had been performed. The compensation can be of two different kinds. 
First, it may be a means replacing compensation the aim of which is to provide the innocent party with 
                                                   
20 By the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the European Research Group on Existing EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group). 
21 By the Commission on European Contract Law. 
22 C. von Bar, E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (München: Sellier, 2009), vol. 1, p 68. 
23  Ch.T. Lewis, Ch. Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), available at: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=pecunia (accessed 20 February 
2018) 
24 A. Sloman, A Grammar of Classical Latin: For Use in Schools and Colleges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1906), p 410. 
25 V. Wilcox, A Company’s Right to Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
p 21. 
26 V. Wilcox, A Company’s Right to Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
p 21; K. Larenz, 'Zur Abgrenzung des Vermögensschadens vom ideellen Schaden', Versicherungsrecht 1963, p 312. 
27 E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, p. 144. 
28 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134 at [87] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
29 Monongahela Navigation Co v US [1893] 148 US 312, 326. 
30 R.E. Goodin, 'Theories of Compensation', 9. OJLS (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies) 1989, p (56) at 59.  
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equivalent means to pursue the same ends as before she suffered the loss (or as she would have 
pursued had she not suffered the loss). Second, it may be an ends-displacing compensation, the aim of 
which is to compensate the innocent party by helping her to pursue different ends in a way that leaves 
her subjectively as well off overall as she would have been had she not suffered the loss at all31. Giving 
a person who suffered severe emotional distress an opportunity to travel to an exotic destination 
might be an example of the latter kind of compensation. Thus, even though eradicating losses may 
frequently be impossible, as for example in cases where the innocent party has suffered a permanent 
bodily injury or severe emotional distress, 32 an adequate compensation may still be available. 
 
7. In order to provide the innocent party with ‘a full and perfect equivalent’ for the loss suffered, 
a remedial response must comprise both pecuniary and non-pecuniary consequences of a breach of 
contract.33 Thus, it is not the availability of damages for non-pecuniary loss in contract law but its 
unavailability that needs a justification.  
 
3. Defensibility of the General Bar to Compensation of Non-Pecuniary Loss in 
Contract Law 
 
8. The general denial of the recoverability of non-pecuniary loss caused by a breach of contract in 
numerous European jurisdictions is usually justified by a reference to reasons of policy. The next part 
of the paper seeks to investigate whether the reasons of policy indicated in academic literature and 
case law are sufficient to justify the refusal to award damages for non-pecuniary loss in contract law.  
 
3.1 Problems of Proof and Difficult Assessment 
 
9. One of the major reasons advanced for the refusal of damages for non-pecuniary loss in 
contract law is the impossibility of its objective estimation34. Furthermore, it has been claimed that 
because of the elusiveness and subjective character of such loss, its existence and scope are difficult to 
prove35. Hence, awards of moral damages are arbitrary and subjective. As a result, where non-
pecuniary loss is compensable, the parties entering into a contract are not able to estimate the scope 
                                                   
31 The distinction was introduced by R.E. Goodin. See R.E. Goodin, 9. OJLS 1989, p (56) at 60. Compare with the 
classification offered by Atiyah: P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p 407ff.   
32 R. Stevens, in Exploring Contract Law, p 174. 
33  J. Kohler, Deutsches Patentrecht systematisch bearbeitet unter vergleichender Berücksichtigung des französischen 
Patentrechts (Mannheim und Straßburg: Bensheimer 1878), p 651; J. Kohler, Die Ideale im Recht, 5. Archiv für 
bürgerliches Recht 1891, p (161) at 258. See also F.Ph. von Kübel, Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, Teil 1, Allgemeiner 
Teil, in W. Schubert (ed.), Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren für die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwurfs eines 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), p 719. 
34 E. Macdonald, 'Contractual Damages for Mental Distress', 7. JCL (Journal of Contract Law) 1994, p (141) at 155. 
35 See F. Dawson, 'General Damages in Contract for Non-Pecuniary Loss', 10. NZULR (New Zealand Universities Law 
Review) 1983, p (232) at 259. 
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of liability in the event of breach,36 which creates uncertainty and unpredictability in commercial 
affairs37. 
 
10. This point is not entirely unjustified. It may indeed be difficult for a court to recognize the 
occurrence of non-pecuniary loss in a given case with certainty and to convert such loss into its money 
equivalent. However, the same problems arise in cases in which non-pecuniary loss is caused by a 
tortious act. Nevertheless, the compensability of non-pecuniary loss has never been questioned in this 
context38. There is no reason why a difficult assessment should justify a denial of compensation for 
immaterial damage in contract, and not in tort. The courts have developed specific rules for the 
assessment of intangible losses in tort law and have identified factors that may influence the scope of 
negative feelings suffered by the injured person. There is a clear tendency in European systems to 
proportion and tailor awards in relation to the duration and intensity of pain and the level and gravity 
of injuries, as well as societal expectations and standards of living39. This guidance may also be 
applicable to the estimation of non-pecuniary losses that have arisen from a breach of contract. Using 
similar rules by courts to quantify damages for non-pecuniary loss would ensure the internal 
consistency of awards. 40 As a result, it would guarantee the desired certainty and predictability in 
commercial affairs as well as both vertical (adequate amounts for greater and lesser injuries) and 
horizontal (similar amounts for similar injuries) justice41. 
 Apart from the above-indicated arguments, it should also be stressed that the problems of 
proof and assessment are practical difficulties and not ones of principle. If, in principle, moral damage 




11. The general denial of the compensability of non-pecuniary loss in contract law has also been 
explained on the grounds that such loss is not within the contemplation of the parties concluding a 
contract.43 However, one may point out that a breach of contract causes non-pecuniary loss so often 
that the parties must foresee the possibility of its occurrence. It would not be unusual to expect 
                                                   
36 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344 (HCA) 369 (Brennan J). 
37 F. Dawson, 10. NZULR 1983, p (232) at 234. See also:  G. Schiemann, in M. Martinek (ed.), J von Staudingers 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch: Staudinger BGB – Buch 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse §§ 249-254 
(Schadensersatzrecht) (Berlin: Sellier – De Gruyter, 
38 I. Ramsay, 'Comment: Contracts – Damages for Mental Distress – Injury to Feelings', 55. CBR (The Canadian Bar 
Review/La Revue du Barreau Canadien) 1977, p (169) at 173; A.S. Burrows, 'Mental distress damages in contract – a 
decade of change', LMCLQ (Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly) 1984, p (119) at 133. See also D. 
Nicolesco, Du dommage moral résultant de l’inexécution d’un contrat en droit comparé (Thèse pour le doctorat) (Paris: 
Libraire Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, 1914), p 34ff. 
39 V.V. Palmer, General Introduction, in VV Palmer (ed) The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss in European Contract 
Law, p 14. 
40 M.G. Bridge, 'Contractual Damages for Intangible Loss: A Comparative Analysis', 62. CBR (The Canadian Bar 
Review/La Revue du Barreau Canadien) 1984, p (323) at 368. 
41 V.V. Palmer, in The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss, p 14. 
42 N. Enonchong, 'Breach of Contract and Damages for Mental Distress', 16. OJLS (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies) 
1996, p (617) at 630. See also Lord Mustill in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1995] UKHL 8; 
[1996] AC 344: ‘in several fields the judges are as well accustomed to putting figures to intangibles, and I see no reason 
why the imprecision of the exercise should be a barrier, if that is what fairness demands’. 
43 Johnson v. Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518 [70] (Lord Millet); Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of 
Canada 2006 SCC 30, [2006] 2 SCR 3 [45]. 
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emotional distress to arise from poorly conducted plastic surgery44, a lack of electricity supply to the 
promisee’s house for several months45 or a lack of photographs documenting a wedding ceremony46.  
    
3.3. Assumption of Risk 
 
12. Apart from the argument just discussed, it has also been claimed that it is the foreseeability of 
non-pecuniary loss that justifies the denial of moral damages47. Disappointment or mental distress is 
an almost inevitable consequence of each breach of contract. Therefore, such losses must be in the 
contemplation of the parties concluding a contract and the parties must accept the risk of their 
occurrence.48 This is claimed to be particularly the case when commercial contracts are concerned49.  
 
13. The authors who support the argument do not explain, however, why parties to contracts 
should assume the risk of suffering a certain consequence of breach while being entitled to 
compensation for other damage.50 A person who concludes a contract expects that it will be 
performed. Otherwise, she would not enter into the contract in the first place51. Hence, the promisee 
does not take the risk of the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss in the case of a breach of contract just 
as he does not take the risk of the occurrence of financial loss52.  
 
3.4. The Risk of Excessive Awards 
 
14. A further justification advanced against the compensability of non-pecuniary loss in contract 
law is that a side-effect of the availability of such damages would be the punishment of the contract-
breaker arising from excessive awards53. Nevertheless, one should point out that this argument may 
be a reason for a moderation in measuring damages rather than for the exclusion of the recoverability 
of non-pecuniary losses as such. The fear of excessive awards may be justified in those jurisdictions 
where juries decide on the amount of damages54, which however is not the case in most of the 
European countries. Apart from some occasional variations, judges make rational assessments and 
award modest, and sometimes even frugal, damages for non-pecuniary losses55.  
 
                                                   
44 Sullivan v. O’Connor 296 N.E. 2d 183 (1973). 
45 Judgment of the Polish Supreme Court from 7 December 2011, II CSK 160/11, OSNC 2012, no. 6, pos. 75. 
46 Diesen v. Samson 1971 SLT 49 (Sh Ct). 
47 H. Carty, Contract Theory and Employment Reality, 49. MLR (Modern Law Review) 1986, p (240) at 245.  
48 H. Carty, 49. MLR 1986, p (240) at 245; G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), p 
992–993. 
49 D. Yates, 36. MLR 1973, p (535) at 538. 
50 N. Enonchong, 16. OJLS 1996, p (617) at 630; A. Phang, 'The Crumbling Edifice? The Award of Contractual 
Damages for Mental Distress', JBL (Journal of Business Law) 2003, p (341) at 350. 
51 D. Friedmann, 111. LQR 1995, p (628) at 629. 
52 A.S. Burrows, LMCLQ 1984, p (119) at 133; A.S. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p 333. 
53 A. Phang, JBL 2003, p 341 at  (345)–346. 
54 J.A. Sebert, 'Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective 
of Full Compensation', 33. UCLA LR (University of California at Los Angeles Law Review) 1986, p (1565) at 1599. 
55 A. Phang, JBL 2003, p (341) at 349–350; E. VEITCH, 'Sentimental Damages in Contract', 16. UWOLR (University 
of Western Ontario Law Review) 1977, p (227) at 240; V.V. Palmer, in The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss, p 15. 
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3.5. Higher Costs of Contracting 
 
15. A further justification advanced to refuse damages for non-pecuniary loss in contract law is 
that the compensability of such loss would increase the cost of contracting56. This argument is not 
altogether without force. The recoverability of non-pecuniary loss in contract law may indeed produce 
additional costs related to the estimation and award of damages or the bargaining for an out-of-court 
settlement57. Such costs certainly may influence the price of goods and services.  
 
16. However, the recoverability of moral damages would also have a range of positive 
consequences. For instance, it would save the costs involved if the injured party is unable to recover 
for the damage suffered58. Moreover, it would respond to the demands of justice in ensuring that 
individuals are compensated for the negative results of a breach of contract59. At the same time, as 
mentioned above, the award of damages for non-pecuniary loss is usually modest in European legal 
systems. Thus, the cost of meeting such claims would not be high enough to be considered a sound 
reason to displace the indicated benefits. 
   
3.6. Fears of Floodgates 
 
17. The next argument against the recoverability of non-pecuniary loss in contract law is that it 
would open the floodgates to large numbers of claims60. This point lacks substance like almost all 
other floodgates arguments. If, in principle, damages for non-pecuniary loss caused by a breach of 
contract should be allowed, then it should not be refused on the basis that, if allowed, it would actually 
be claimed61. Furthermore, there are factors that would substantially limit the number of litigations 
even if non-pecuniary loss were compensable. First, the cost of pursuing a claim would deter 
individuals who suffered insignificant intangible damage from going to court. Second, some legal 
systems adopt the de minimis principle that would filter out negligible claims62. Third, corporate 
entities could not claim damages for non-pecuniary loss because they cannot suffer such damage63. 
Fourth, the parties could exclude liability for non-pecuniary damage through a specific provision in a 
contract, subject to the regulations on unfair terms64. Fifth, the recoverability of moral damages 
would be subject to normal rules limiting liability for any loss caused by a breach of contract. Thus, 
the rules on causation, remoteness, and mitigation would exclude or reduce the award of moral 
damages in certain cases65. 
                                                   
56 Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw from 8 September 2009, VI ACa 201/09, LexPolonica no. 2073868; 
D.W. Greig, J.L.R. Davis, The Law of Contract (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1987), p 1414.  
57 S. Harder, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations: The Search for Harmonised Principles (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), p 109. 
58 E. Macdonald, 7. JCL 1994, p (134) at 146–47; S. Harder, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations, p 109. 
59 Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (Mc Hugh J), (1993) 176 CLR 344 at 397; S. Harder, Measuring Damages in the 
Law of Obligations, p 109; N. Enonchong, 16. OJLS 1996, p (617) at 632. 
60 Hayes v. Dodds [1990] 2 All ER 826 (Staughton LJ); J. Swanton, B. McDonald, Measuring contractual damages for 
defective building work, 70. Australian Law Journal 1996, p (444) at 449. 
61 S. Harder, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations, p 110. 
62 Ibid.  
63 N. Enonchong, 16. OJLS 1996, p (617) at 632. 
64 S. Harder, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations, p 110; J.A. Sebert, 33. UCLA LR 1986, p (1565) at 
1656. 
65 S. Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p 126–127. 
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4. Classification of Cases in which a Breach of Contract May Cause Non-
Pecuniary Loss  
 
18. The presented analysis has shown that the policy objections to moral damages are superficial. 
At the same time, moral damages are necessary to fully compensate the innocent party, namely, to put 
her into as good a position as she would have been in if the contract had been performed. This leads to 
the conclusion that claims for moral damages brought following a breach of contract should be 
allowed. The next part of the paper seeks to identify particular groups of cases in which a breach of 
contract may cause non-pecuniary loss.  
 
19. The examination of case law from several European jurisdictions suggests that there are two 
principal categories of cases in which non-pecuniary loss may arise as the result of a breach of 
contract. The first category consists of cases in which one of the essential aims of the contract is to 
fulfil the non-pecuniary interests of the promisee. The second category comprises cases in which the 
occurrence of non-pecuniary loss is, in a sense, incidental. In other words, the promisee has not 
contracted for any particular non-pecuniary benefit, nevertheless, as a consequence of the breach of 
contract she has suffered non-pecuniary loss66. The categories are not watertight and may overlap. 
Thus, for example, physical injury may result from both non-performance of a contract aimed at 
fulfilling the non-pecuniary interests of the promisee (such as a contract to provide medical services) 
and non-performance of a contract that does not have such a purpose (such as a contract of carriage).  
 
4.2. Contracts Aimed at Fulfilling the Non-Pecuniary Interests of the Promisee 
 
20. The issue of compensability of non-pecuniary loss in contract law is particularly important in 
cases of contracts that aim to fulfil the non-pecuniary interests67 of the promisee.68 In this respect, it 
is necessary to distinguish between ends and means69. In some instances, the financial element in a 
contract may be only a means of guaranteeing peace of mind (for example, in some insurance 
contracts)70. In these types of situations, providing peace of mind constitutes the purpose for which 
the contract was concluded, even if it is to be achieved by economic means71. Furthermore, one 
should point out that contracts are very often made in order to fulfil both the non-pecuniary and 
                                                   
66 Another distinction has been drawn by E. McKendrick and K. Worthington based on the current scope of the 
compensability of such loss in English contract law – see: E. McKendrick, K Worthington, Damages for Non-Pecuniary 
Loss, in N. Cohen, E. McKendrick (eds), Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), p 300ff. See also: F.D. Rose, 'Comment: Contract – Damages – Non-Pecuniary Losses- Injured Feelings and 
Disappointment - Remoteness', 55. CBR (The Canadian Bar Review/La Revue du Barreau Canadien) 1977, p (333) at 
334; AS Burrows, LMCLQ 1984, p (119) at 122–123; F. Dawson, 10. NZULR 1983, p (232) at 233. 
67 The concept of ‘non-pecuniary interest’ is explained more broadly by R. Strasser in Der immaterielle Schaden 
im österreichischen Recht (Wien: Manz, 1964), p 10ff. See also: D. Nicolesco, Du dommage moral résultant de 
l’inexécution d’un contrat, p 6ff. 
68  See J. Kohler, 'Zwölf Studien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch', 12. Archiv für bürgerliches Recht 1987, p 1–88 (part 1) 
and p 317 – 336 (part 2), passim. 
69 E. Macdonald, 7. JCL 1994, p (134) at 145. 
70 E. Macdonald, 7. JCL 1994, p (134) at145. 
71 E. Macdonald, 7. JCL 1994, p (134) at 145. 
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economic interests of the parties72. The analyzed group also embraces these kinds of cases as long as 
the non-pecuniary purpose has a significant meaning for the parties. 
 
21. The category of contracts aimed at fulfilling the non-pecuniary interests of the promisee 
consists of two further subcategories. The first subcategory consists of cases in which the promisor, 
expressly or impliedly, promises to provide enjoyment or alleviation of distress to the promisee. The 
second subcategory comprises cases in which the subject matter of a contract has an ‘added value’ to 
the promisee.  
 
4.2.1. Contracts for Enjoyment or Alleviation of Distress 
 
22. In some cases, the promisor, expressly or impliedly, promises to provide enjoyment or 
alleviation of distress to the promisee. Explicit promises to guarantee such a non-pecuniary benefit 
are infrequent73. Nevertheless, in some cases the promisor explicitly promises to take reasonable care 
in the attempt to procure enjoyment or peace of mind. For example, a solicitor would not guarantee to 
relieve the distress of a client but she could promise to take reasonable care to obtain such relief. 74 
This may be seen in the English case of Hamilton Jones v. David & Snape (a firm) in which a 
solicitor’s negligence resulted in the claimant’s children being taken to Tunisia by her former 
husband where he was awarded their custody75. The client expressly informed the solicitor at the time 
when the contract was concluded that she was afraid that her former husband could attempt to take 
the children from the country. The lawyer assured the client that he would take all necessary measures 
to guarantee her the right of custody of her children, thus, measures aimed at providing peace of mind 
to the client. According to the court the assurance was a significant element of the contract 76.  
 
23. The category of contracts for enjoyment or alleviation of distress comprises a very wide range 
of cases in which the promisor impliedly promises to provide a non-pecuniary benefit to the promisee 
or to take reasonable care to provide such a benefit. The group embraces, for example, holiday 
contracts77, contracts to provide medical services78, to take photographs at a wedding79, or to provide 
burial services80. An implied promise to provide non-pecuniary benefit may also appear in contracts 
made from altruism to improve the environment or for other good causes. Examples of cases arisen 
within this category include the case in which a plastic surgeon performed poor surgery causing the 
patient to look worse while further surgery could not improve her condition81. Another example 
might be the case in which, in breach of contract, the claimants’ daughter was cremated before the 
                                                   
72 E. McKendrick, M. Graham, 'The Sky’s the Limit: Contractual Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss', LMCLQ (Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly) 2002, p (161) at 164. The problem may be seen in the English case of Knott 
v. Bolton (1995) 11 Const LJ 375 concerning a breach of contract by an architect to design a “dream home” for the 
promisees. The couple was denied compensation for disappointment and distress because the contract also had an 
economic purpose. The decision was later overruled in Farley v. Skinner at [24], [41], [52], [93]. 
73 See E. Macdonald, 7. JCL 1994, p (134) at 143. 
74 E. Macdonald, 7. JCL 1994, p (134) at 143. 
75 Hamilton Jones v. David & Snape [2003] EWHC 3147 (Ch), [2004] 1 All ER 657. 
76 See Neuberger J at [61], [63]. 
77 For example, Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233 (CA). 
78 For example, Sullivan v. O’Connor 296 N.E. 2d 183 (1973). 
79 For example, Diesen v. Sampson 1971 SLT 49 (Sh Ct). 
80 For example, Lamm v. Shingleton 55 SE 2d 810 (1949); Reed v. Madon [1989] Ch 408. 
81 Sullivan v. O’Connor 296 N.E. 2d 183 (1973). 
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parents had viewed the body82. Within this group one may also offer the case concerning a Jewish 
congregation in which members unwittingly consumed non-kosher meat in violation of their religious 
convictions due to a breach of contract by a butcher83. While in some of these cases the promisor may 
not expressly promise to secure the promisee’s non-pecuniary interests or to take reasonable care to 
secure such interests, it is clear that the benefit contracted for is indivisibly connected with the 
pleasure or peace of mind that the promisee expects to obtain as a result of the performance of a 
contract84.  
 
24. There is no doubt that the law should respect non-pecuniary interests in contractual 
performance, especially, in cases where the intention to obtain enjoyment or alleviation of distress 
motivated the promisee to conclude a contract. Taking into account that the failure to obtain the 
intangible benefit contracted for is usually the only consequence of non-performance of contracts that 
belong to the discussed category, the unrecoverability of damages for non-pecuniary loss would 
render the promisor’s promise unenforceable. This is particularly important because the non-
pecuniary loss that arises in such situations is very often irreversible. Even if the promisor could 
provide a substitute performance, the promisee might not achieve the expected result. Likewise, the 
award of damages for financial loss could protect the interests of the promisee only to a very limited 
extent if obtaining an intangible benefit was the main purpose of the contract. 
  
4.2.2. Added Value 
 
25. The next subcategory consists of cases in which the performance of a contract has an ‘added 
value’ to the promisee. Thus, the group includes cases in which the financial value of the subject 
matter of a contract is slight compared to the actual value that the promisee attaches to it.  
 
4.2.2.1. ‘Objective’ Added Value 
 
26. The ‘added value’ that the performance of a contract may have for the promisee can be 
twofold. First, it can have an objective meaning, commonly respected in society and recognizable 
from the point of view of a third party. Non-pecuniary loss arising in relation to an objective added 
value may concern, for example, the infringement of praetium affectionis caused by non-performance 
of a contract to renovate a family memento that has a sentimental value to the promisee85. There is no 
doubt that such an infringement may lead to the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss, the scope of which 
may exceed the financial value of the performance of a contract86. Therefore, the award of damages for 
economic loss suffered may not sufficiently protect the interests of the promisee. At the same time, 
the non-pecuniary loss that may occur in such cases does usually, objectively, deserve to be 
                                                   
82 McNeil v. Forest Lawn Memorial Services Ltd (1976) 72 D. L. R. (3d) 556 (Canada). 
83 Trib. Com. Lyon 18.09.1936, Gaz. Pal. 1936.2.893. 
84 E. McKendrick, K. Worthington, in Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract, p 302. 
85 See: D. Störmer, Der Ersatz des Affektionsinteresses in geschichtlicher Entwicklung (Dissertation) (Hamburg, 1977), 
passim. 
86 A. Szpunar, 'Utrata możliwości korzystania z rzeczy', 10. Rejent 1998, p 18–20; A. Szpunar, 'O sposobach 
naprawienia szkody na mieniu', 11. Nowe Prawo 1971, p 1603. 
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compensated. Praetium affectionis is considered a value worthy of protection in several European 
jurisdictions87.  
The objective added value of performance of a contract may also be seen in some cases in 
which the aim of the contract is to confer an intangible benefit upon the promisee. Thus, the two 
categories of cases may overlap. There is no doubt that delivering a wedding dress by a certain time, 
making photographs during a family event or providing transport for a funeral of a close person are 
generally worth more to the promisee than the price paid. At the same time, in these cases the 
existence of an intangible interest of the promisee and its infringement are relatively easy to recognize 
for the court.  
 
4.2.2.2. ‘Subjective’ (Unusual) Added Value 
 
27. The ‘added value’ of contractual performance may also be purely subjective and be 
recognizable only from the point of view of the promisee herself. An example of this may be seen in 
the English case of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth88 concerning a contract to 
build a swimming pool89. The swimming pool was built to the wrong depth, which, however, in no 
way affected its economic value, or the claimant’s use of the pool. Nevertheless, the difference in 
depth was clearly of importance to the claimant because of his individual tastes (the claimant was a 
particularly tall man). The court stated that it is necessary to take into account the subjective value of 
contractual performance to the promisee when awarding damages for a breach of contract. To award 
nothing in such cases would be to say that the promise was illusory90. The court asserted that ‘the law 
must cater for those occasions where the value of the promise to the promisee exceeds the financial 
enhancement of his position which full performance will secure’91. Therefore, damages for a breach 
of contract should not be limited to the compensation of economic loss92.  
 
28. The main argument for the compensability of non-pecuniary loss in cases in which the 
performance of a contract had a subjective added value to the promisee is that the law should enable 
the parties to fulfil all of their interests as long as they are not against the law. The promisee, when 
entering into a contract, desires to obtain the specified performance. The promisor, on the other 
hand, promises to perform the contract according to its content. There is no doubt that the law should 
protect the interests of the promisee even if it has an unusual, subjective nature93. Nevertheless, the 
                                                   
87 In addition to the ‘liberal’ jurisdictions mentioned above (p 1) see e.g. § 1331 of the ABGB; F. Bydlinski, 'Der 
immaterielle Schaden in der österreichischen Rechtsentwicklung', in H.C. Ficker, D. König, K.F. Kreuzer, H.G. Leser, 
W.F.M. von Bieberstein, P. Schlechtriem (eds), Festschrift für Ernst von Caemmerer zum 70. Geburtstag (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 1978), p 788ff. 
88 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1995] UKHL 8; [1996] AC 344. 
89 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1995] UKHL 8; [1996] AC 344. 
90 See also B. Coote, 'Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest', 53. CLJ (The Cambridge Law Journal) 
1997, p (537) at 541; F. Dawson, 'Reflections on Certain Aspects of the Law of Damages for Breach of Contract', 9. 
JCL (Journal of Contract Law) 1995, p (125) at 125-126; J. Poole, 'Damages for Breach of Contract – Compensation 
and Personal Preferences: Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth', 59. MLR (Modern Law Review) 1996, p 
(272) at 273; J. O’Sullivan, 'Contract Damages for the Failed Fun – Taking the Plunge', 54. CLJ (The Cambridge Law 
Journal) 1995, p (496) at 498;. 
91 Lord Mustill in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1995] UKHL 8; [1996] AC 344. 
92 E. McKendrick, K. Worthington, in Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract, p 306. 
93 L. Domanski, Instytucje kodeksu zobowiązań, Komentarz teoretyczno-praktyczny, vol 1 (Warszawa: M. Ginter, 1938), 
p 392. 
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special character of this group of cases suggests that it should be approached with a great caution. An 
unusual, subjective value that the performance has to the promisee, and consequently, the occurrence 
and the scope of immaterial loss in the case of a breach of contract, may raise significant problems of 
proof.  
 In the English case of Farley v Skinner Lord Hutton pointed out a range of circumstances that 
should be taken into account when identifying non-pecuniary loss caused by a breach of contract. For 
instance, he asserted that the following factors should be considered: (1) whether the matter in 
respect of which the individual claimant seeks damages is of importance to him; (2) whether the 
individual claimant has made clear to the other party that the matter is of importance to him; and (3) 
whether the action to be taken in relation to the matter is made a specific term of the contract94. The 
proposed criteria might be useful to identify the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss in a given case. 
However, they do not solve the problem of identifying the scope of such loss. The identification of the 
scope of non-pecuniary loss in cases belonging to the analyzed category by anyone other than the 
promisee herself is exposed to a great risk of error. The negative consequences of a wrong assessment 
of loss may affect both the promisor (if the award exceeds the loss actually suffered) and the promisee 
(if the award is lower than the loss actually suffered). It seems that in these cases, a greater protection 
of the interests of the promisee may be ensured by a liquidated damages clause rather than by 
damages estimated by the court. A liquidated damages clause may be used by the promisee to protect 
a subjective added value in performance by accurately pricing the intrinsic value she assigns to it.  
 
4.3. Non-pecuniary Loss as an Incidental Result of the Non-Performance of a Contract  
 
29. The second category consists of cases in which the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss is 
incidental95. The incidental non-pecuniary losses can be divided into further subcategories which, 
again, may overlap. The types of incidental non-pecuniary losses that have been recognized in the 
case law include: (i) consequences of an infringement of personality rights; (ii) consequences of an 
infringement of praetium affectionis; (iii) physical inconveniences; (iv) anxiety, mental distress and 
disappointment.  
 
4.3.1. Infringement of Personality Rights 
 
30. Non-performance of a contract may lead to losses consisting of the negative consequences of 
an infringement of personality rights96. Personality rights are defined as rights that ‘recognize a 
person as a physical and spiritual-moral being and guarantee his enjoyment of his own sense of 
existence’97. The scope of personality rights is broad and comprises, among others, the rights to life, 
physical integrity, bodily freedom, reputation, dignity, privacy, and identity98. An infringement of 
                                                   
94 Lord Hutton in Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49; [2002] 2 AC 732, [54]. 
95 A.S. Burrows, LMCLQ 1984, p (119) at 126. 
96 In jurisdictions in which the concept of personality rights is not recognized there are equivalent categories of cases 
involving, for instance, bodily injury, illness or loss of reputation. 
97 J. Neethling, 'Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview', 38. The Comparative and International Journal of 
Southern Africa 2005, p (210) at 210. 
98 V.V. Palmer, 'Preliminary taxonomy and glossary of moral damages', in V.V. Palmer (ed.) The Recovery of Non-
Pecuniary Loss in European Contract Law, p 408.  
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personality rights almost by definition tends to cause non-pecuniary loss99. In some instances, these 
types of losses may give rise to both contract and tort claims. However, this does not necessarily have 
to be the case, taking into account that both liability regimes require the parties to satisfy different 
prerequisites. An example of a situation in which an infringement of personality rights resulting from 
a breach of contract could hardly constitute a tort is the case in which the claimant purchased woollen 
underwear from the defendant retailer100. The underwear contained an excess of sulphur compounds 
which caused the claimant to suffer intense dermatitis. Similarly, a breach of contract caused bodily 
injury in the case where the claimant purchased a body lotion from the defendant. As a result of the 
use of the lotion the claimant suffered extensive damage to the skin, which temporarily prevented her 
from meeting with other people101.  
 
31. Non-pecuniary loss caused by an infringement of personality rights is compensable in tort law 
in most of the European jurisdictions. However, in many of the legal systems the recoverability of 
such loss is denied in contract. The need for equal treatment of this kind of case in both contract and 
tort has been strongly supported in legal writings 102. It has been argued that the source of 
infringement (a tortious act or a breach of contract) should be irrelevant to the lawmaker when 
making a decision on types of interests that should be protected by law103. One could argue that tort 
liability occurs as a result of a violation of generally applicable norms, thus, a behavior that deserves a 
particularly negative assessment. However, this argument is not convincing. First, one should point 
out that the circumstances in which tort liability may arise are not limited to intentional or negligent 
conduct of the tortfeasor. Non-pecuniary loss may also arise in cases in which the law provides for 
strict liability. Thus, the possibility to claim moral damages in tort law is, in general, not dependent on 
a particularly undesirable behavior of the tortfeasor. Second, the purpose of civil liability is not to 
sanction activities that are considered reprehensible but to transfer the burden of damage suffered 
from the innocent party to the person who caused it104. The scope of the compensable loss should 
therefore be established from the perspective of the injured and not the person responsible for its 
occurrence.  
 
4.3.2. Infringement of Praetium Affectionis  
 
32. As it was pointed out earlier, the infringement of praetium affectionis is very often a result of 
non-performance of a contract aimed at fulfilling the non-pecuniary interests of the promisee. In 
particular, it may be a consequence of a breach of contract to secure, improve or renovate an item that 
has a personal meaning to the promisee. Nevertheless, the infringement of praetium affectionis may 
also be an incidental result of a breach of contract which purpose was not to fulfil the intangible 
interests of the promisee. An example of this could be the well-known French case in which a contract 
                                                   
99 V.V. Palmer, in The Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Loss, p 408. 
100 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85. See also: Wren v. Holt [1903] 1 KB 610; Summer v. Salford 
Corporation [1943] AC 283 and Godley v Perry [1960] 1 WRL 9. 
101 Trib. Seine 11.10.1937, Gaz. Pal. 1937,  II 792. 
102 R. von Jhering, 'Ein Rechtsgutachten, betreffend die Gäubahn', 18. Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen 
römischen und deutschen Privatrechts 1880, p 50; M. Safjan, 'Naprawienie krzywdy niemajątkowej w ramach 
odpowiedzialności ex contractu', in M. Pyziak-Szafnicka (ed) Odpowiedzialność cywilna. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci 
Profesora Adama Szpunara (Kraków: Zakamycze, 2004), p 266; J. Jastrzebski, 'Kara umowna a ochrona interesów 
niemajątkowych w reżimie kontraktowym', 4. Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego 2006, p 953 at 970. 
103 R. von Jhering, 18. Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts 1880, p 50. 
104 M. Kalinski, Szkoda na mieniu i jej naprawienie (Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 2014), p 146ff. 
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was made between a horse owner and a horse trainer105. The purpose of the contract was to prepare 
the horse to take part in a particular horse race. Under the contract, the horse had been trained for 
almost a year before the race. On the day of the race, the trainer negligently left a portable lamp in the 
loose box. The horse bit through the lamp cable and was electrocuted. The horse owner claimed 
damages for non-pecuniary loss resulting from the loss of the animal to which he was emotionally 
attached. It can be seen that the purpose of the contract between the horse owner and the horse 
trainer did not necessarily have to be to fulfil the intangible interests of the promisee. It is probable 
that the horse-owner entered into the contract in order to obtain financial benefits related to the 
participation in the race. Hence, the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss could be in this case 
incidental.  
 
33. A sentimental value placed upon an object or an animal, in general, deserves to be protected 
regardless of whether its loss results from a breach of contract aimed at fulfilling the non-pecuniary 
interests of the promisee or occurs as an incidental result of a breach. The non-pecuniary loss that 
arises in such cases is usually recognizable from the perspective of the third person and involves the 
infringement of values commonly accepted in the society. There is no reason to limit the 
compensability of such losses to cases in which the purpose of the contract is to fulfil intangible 
interests of one of the parties. It may be alleged that the introduction of such limitation would just 
lead to a very broad interpretation of the concept of the non-pecuniary purpose of a contract by the 
courts, in a way that would also allow for the compensation of incidental consequences of a breach. 
 
4.3.3. Physical Inconveniences  
 
34. The third subcategory consists of cases in which the promisee suffers physical inconvenience 
as a result of a breach of contract. Compensation of such non-pecuniary losses is allowed, for 
example, in English law, where the first cases in which damages were awarded for physical 
inconvenience appeared as early as the 19th century. In the case of Hobbs v. London and South 
Western Rly Co. of 1875106 the defendant railway company, in breach of contract, failed to transport 
the claimant and his family to the agreed destination and instead abandoned them after midnight in a 
different place, leaving them with a five-mile walk home in the rain. The claimant was awarded 
damages for the inconvenience suffered. In the more recent case of Perry v. Sidney Phillips & Son107 
damages for physical inconvenience were awarded in the context of a negligence claim against a 
surveyor who failed to observe serious defects, including a leaking roof and a septic tank with an 
offensive smell. In the case of Perera v. Vandiyar 108 the claimant tenant was awarded damages for 
inconvenience suffered as a result of a breach of the tenancy contract when the landlord, to force him 
out, cut off the gas and electricity supply for a period of six days.  
 
35. The compensability of physical inconvenience arising from a breach of contract is entirely 
justified. This may be seen particularly in the context of the case law of jurisdictions in which such 
losses are not recoverable. The Polish Supreme Court, for example, refused to award damages for 
non-pecuniary loss in a case in which the defendant energy enterprise in breach of contract 
                                                   
105 Cour de cassation, Civ. (1), 16.01.1962 r., D 1962.199, S 1962.281, JCP 1962 II.12447. 
106 Hobbs v. London and South Western Rly Co. (1875) LR 10 QB 111. 
107 Perry v. Sidney Phillips & Son (1982) 1 WLR 1297. 
108 Perera v. Vandiyar [1953] 1 WLR 672.  
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suspended electricity supply to the claimant’s house for nine months, even though the breach caused 
enormous discomfort to the claimant and his family109.  
 
36. As the examples show, physical inconvenience is usually caused by a severe infringement of 
the intangible interests of the promisee. A lack of possibility to claim damages for non-pecuniary loss 
would deprive these interests of sufficient protection. The occurrence of such loss is, in general, easy 
to recognize for the court, which minimalizes the risk of its wrong identification. Furthermore, such 
losses very often have a broad scope and are foreseeable. Hence, there are no reasons to leave the 
burden of its compensation on the promisee.  
 
4.3.4. Anxiety, Mental Distress and Disappointment  
 
37. The final group consists of cases of anxiety, mental distress and disappointment. In almost 
every case of non-performance of a contract the promisee experiences a feeling of dissatisfaction, 
which may be classified as non-pecuniary loss110. The recoverability of such losses cannot be 
questioned from the axiological perspective – their occurrence is the result of a breach of contract, 
thus, a negatively assessed behavior of the promisor. On the other hand, such losses are difficult to 
prove and to evaluate in court. Therefore, it is very often claimed that they should be unrecoverable.  
 
38. It seems, however, that the problem of the compensability of the usual anxiety, distress and 
disappointment is of a theoretical, rather than practical, nature. One should point out, for instance, 
that in some jurisdictions the principle of de minimis non curat lex applies, according to which the law 
does not concern itself with trifles111 . One may assume that the usual anxiety, distress and 
disappointment will almost always be de minimis112. Furthermore, it would be very difficult for the 
claimant to prove the extent of such losses. Moreover, the costs of litigation will be a factor limiting 
the number of claims in cases in which the scope of loss is slight113. Burrows makes another point114. 
In cases in which the promisee expected to receive only financial benefit from the performance of a 
contract, the award of damages for economic loss can compensate for the suffered disappointment. 
Furthermore, even if the promisee expected to receive mental benefit from the performance, she will 
not be awarded moral damages, so long as an award for damages for economic loss will enable her to 
buy a substitute providing the same mental benefit. For these reasons, even if damages for the usual 
anxiety, mental distress and disappointment caused by a breach of contract are available, in practice 




                                                   
109 Judgment of the Polish Supreme Court from 7 December 2011, II CSK 160/11, OSNC 2012, no. 6, pos. 75. 
110 A.S. Burrows, LMCLQ 1984, p (119) at 132; F Dawson, 10. NZULR 1983, p (232) at 255–256; M.G. Bridge, 
'Contractual Damages for Intangible Loss: A Comparative Analysis', 62. CBR (The Canadian Bar Review/La Revue du 
Barreau Canadien) 1984, p (323) at 360. 
111 N. Enonchong, 16. OJLS 1996, p (617) at 636; S. Harder, Measuring Damages in the Law of Obligations, 111ff. 
112 N. Enonchong, 16. OJLS 1996, p (617) at 636. 
113 M.G. Bridge, 62. CBR 1984, p (323) at 360. 
114 A.S. Burrows, LMCLQ 1984, p (119) at 123, 125. 
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39. Starting with the fundamental idea that the essence of contract is performance, this paper has 
shown that, in the case of a breach of contract, the remedial response must comprise both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary consequences suffered by the innocent party. The paper has demonstrated that 
there are no immediate reasons to deprive the promisee of an adequate protection of her contractual 
rights by denying the recoverability of non-pecuniary losses. In order to ensure the proper protection 
of the interests of the promisee, it is necessary to allow claims for moral damages in all types of cases 
in which non-pecuniary loss may occur as a result of a breach of contract. This includes both cases in 
which the aim of a contract is to fulfil the non-pecuniary interests of the promisee (i.e. cases in which 
the aim of a contract is to provide enjoyment or alleviation of distress to the promisee and cases in 
which the performance of a contract has an ‘added value’ to the promisee), as well as cases in which 
the occurrence of non-pecuniary loss is incidental (i.e. cases in which the breach of contract caused 
an infringement of personality rights or praetium affectionis; physical inconveniences; or anxiety, 
mental distress and disappointment).  
